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NOTES & COMMENTS
UNITED STATES V. BYRUM-APPLICATION OF
§ 2036(a) TO TRANSFERS OF STOCK INTO INTER
VIVOS TRUST BY THE CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDER OF A CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATION
When certiorari was granted' in United States v. Byrum, 2 it appeared
that the Supreme Court would put to rest some of the uncertainty and
confusion that has for years plagued both the courts and practitioners
concerning the proper interpretation of§ 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.3 When the decision in that case was handed down,4 however, it was apparent that estate planners and courts alike would have to
continue interpreting § 2036(a) with little additional guidance. Mr. Justice White in a forceful dissent said, "[I]t is apparent that, if tolerated,
, The
Byrum's scheme will open a gaping hole in the estate tax laws. . ...
Solicitor General, apparently sharing Mr. Justice White's point of view,
1404 U.S. 937 (1971).
2408 U.S. 125 (1972).
IIr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE-The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an

adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom.
The purpose of§ 2036, together with § 2038 (Revocable transfers), is to prevent avoidance
of estate taxation by means of an inter vivos transfer of property where the transferor has
not given up beneficial enjoyment, or control over the beneficial enjoyment, of the transferred property. Section 2036(a)(2) and § 2038 overlap to a considerable extent. See Van
Vechten, The Grantor'sRetention of Powers as Trustee or Otherwise, Income and Estate
Tax Consequences, N.Y.U. 25TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 943, 946-47 (1967); Note, The Doctrine of External Standardsunder Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038, 52 MINN. L. REv. 1071,

1073 (1968).
'United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), rehearing denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3189
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1972). The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Powell, in which he
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, and Rehnquist.
11d. at 153 (White, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun.
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immediately began preparing to petition for rehearing. The Government
noted in its brief on petition for rehearing' that Lawyer's Weekly Report
hailed Byrum as a "Sweeping Taxpayer Victory ' 7 and that the Kiplinger
Tax Letter commented, "Owners of closely held firms get a new way to
beat estate tax . . . sounds almost too good to be true, but Supreme
Court gives its blessing."'
The Byrum decision, however, does not create the "loophole" some
apparently think it has. The Court did construe both (a)(1) and (a)(2) of
§ 2036 narrowly, but the Court's analysis does not provide a risk-free
mechanism for estate tax avoidance. What the decision leaves unclear is
the extent of the remaining risk. For while the Court's construction of
(a)(1) may add some certainty to the future application of that portion
of the statute, its construction of (a)(2) obfuscates an already uncertain
area of the law.
The basic issue before the Court in Byrum was whether the value of
shares of stock transferred into an irrevocable inter vivos trust by the
decedent, Milliken C. Byrum, should be included in his gross estate under
§ 2036(a).9 Byrum created the trust in 1958, and at various times thereafter transferred into it shares of common voting stock of three closely
held corporations. Prior to the creation of the trust, Byrum had owned
at least 71% of the stock in each of the corporations; at his death in 1964,
he owned more than 50% of the stock in only one of the corporations.'0
Of the minority shareholders, at least five in each of the corporations
were unrelated by name to Byrum." By the trust agreement Byrum re'Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing at 2, United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
7
Lawyer's Weekly Report, July 17, 1972, at 106.
8The Kiplinger Tax Letter, June 30, 1972, at 3.
9See note 3 supra.
'*At Byrum's death, the relative percentages of stock ownership, found in 408 U.S. at
130 n.2, were as follows:

Byrum Lithographing
Co., Inc.
Graphic Realty, Inc.
Bychrome Co.

Percentage Owned
by Decedent

Percentage Owned
by Trust

59
35
42

12
48
46

Total Percentage
Owned by Decedent
and Trust
71
83
88

"The majority stated that a "substantial number" of the minority shareholders in the
corporations were unrelated to Byrum. 408 U.S. at 142.
In Byrum Lithographing Co., Inc., none of the other 11 stockholders
appears to be related by name to Byrum. In Bychrome Co. five of the eight
stockholders appear to be unrelated to the Byrums; and in Graphic Realty
Co. II of the fourteen stockholders appear to be unrelated.
Id. n.20.
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served to himself for life the right to vote the trust shares and to veto their
sale or investment by the trustee, and the right to remove the trustee and
designate another corporate trustee to serve as successor. 2 The beneficiaries of the trust were his children or, in the event of their death before
the termination of the trust, their surviving children. The trustee was
authorized in its "absolute and sole discretion"13 to pay the income and
principal of the trust to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
The Government contended that the value of the transferred shares
was includable in Byrum's gross estate under either or both of the standards set forth in § 2036(a). By reserving the right to vote the transferred
shares together with shares owned by him, Byrum had retained voting
control of the corporations. By reserving the right to veto the sale of the
transferred shares, he had the ability to maintain his position of voting
control' 4 throughout his lifetime. The Government maintained that
through retention of these powers, Byrum had retained "enjoyment of
. . . the property" within the meaning of§ 2036(a)(1) and "the right...
"Under the Trust agreement, the powers and rights of the trustee included the power
to sell and invest all or any part of the trust property, subject to the limitation at 5.15 of
the Trust agreement:
[Tihe Trustee shall not exercise [the power to sell or invest trust property]
unless (a) during the Grantor's lifetime said Grantor shall approve of the
action taken by the Trustee pursuant to said powers, (b) after the death
of the Grantor and as long as his wife, Marian A. Byrum, shall live, said
wife shall approve of the action taken by the Trustee pursuant to said
powers.
Id. at 128-29 n.1.
Article 5.06 empowered the Trustee to vote by proxy or in person any trust shares
subject to a similar limitation:
[Diuring Grantor's lifetime, all voting rights of any stocks which are not
listed on a stock exchange, shall be exercised by Grantor, and after Grantor's death, the voting rights of such stocks shall be exercised by Grantor's
wife during her lifetime.
Id.
"Id. at 127, where it is stated:
Until the youngest living child reached age 21, the trustee was authorized in its "absolute and sole discretion" to pay the income and principal
of the trust to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries, "with due regard to
their individual needs for education, care, maintenance and support."
After the youngest child reached 21, the trust was to be divided into
separate trusts for each child, to terminate when the beneficiaries reached
35. The trustee was authorized in its discretion to pay income and principal from these trusts to the beneficiaries for emergency or other "worthy
needs," including education.
"The Government used "control" in the sense of the right to vote more than 50% of
the outstanding shares. The majority argued that control was a nebulous standard "too
variable and imprecise to constitute the basis per se for imposing tax liability under
§ 2036(a)." 408 U.S. at 138 n.13. See text accompanying notes 28 and 86 infra.
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to designate the persons who shall enjoy . . .the income" within the
meaning of § 2036(a)(2).15
§ 2036(a)(i)-Retained Enjoyment

In support of its § 2036(a)(1) position, the Government argued that
by virtue of the rights which Byrum had retained, he had insured to
himself continued employment and compensation and the right to determine whether and when the corporations would liquidate or merge. These
benefits, the Government contended, amounted to retained enjoyment of
the transferred property. 6 The Court, however, rejected this argument
and concluded "that Byrum's retention of voting control was not the
retention of the enjoyment of the transferred property within the meaning
of the statute."'

17

The primary basis for the Court's conclusion was that "enjoyment"
as that term is used in § 2036(a)(1) contemplates something other than
the benefits attributed to Byrum by the Government. "The statutory
language plainly contemplates retention of an attribute of the property
transferred-such as a right to income, use of the property itself, or a
power of appointment with respect either to income or principal. '"'8 The
Court stated further:
[I]t is well settled that the terms "enjoy" and "enjoyment," as used
in various estate tax statutes, "are not terms of art, but connote
substantial present economic benefit rather than technical vesting
of title or estates." Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S.
480, 486 (1946). 19
For example, the majority maintained that the power to liquidate and
merge, one of the benefits attributed to Byrum by the Government, was
2
a contingent benefit and not a present benefit. 1
Nor was continued employment and compensation "enjoyment" of
the transferred property. Where income-producing property is involved,
it would seem that in order to fall within § 2036(a)(1), a decedent must
have had beneficial use in a pecuniary sense of the transferred property.2'
"1408 U.S. at 132, 145.
"Id.at 145.
'11d. at 150.
"Id. at 149.
"Id.at 145-46. See Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied. 361 U.S. 829 (1959); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Ill.
1968);
Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), acquiesced in,1949-2 CUM. BULL. 3.
2408 U.S. at 149-50.
"United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969); Commissioner v. Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). See Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Guynn v. United States, 437 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1971);
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As the majority pointed out, the courts have found a taxpayer's conduct
to amount to "possession" or "enjoyment" as used in § 2036(a)(1) only
where an owner of income-producing property has transferred title but
retained an income interest or where an owner of real property has retained lifetime use of the property.? The Court stated that in none of the
cases cited by the Government where income-producing property was
involved had a court held a person to have retained possession or enjoyment of property if title had been irrevocably transferred, delivery completely made, and the right to income relinquished.?3 The Treasury Regulations also support the interpretation that where income-producing property is involved, "enjoyment" means retention of an income interest. 2
Under the facts of Byrum, then, the decedent must have enjoyed the
dividends on the transferred trust shares to have "enjoyed" the transferred property within the meaning of § 2036(a)(1). Even if Byrum had
insured himself of employment and compensation by retaining voting
control, the economic benefits which he would thereby enjoy would not
be enjoyment of income from the transferred property.
However, if Byrum had used his voting control to pay himself an
unreasonably large salary, it could be argued that he had retained enjoyment of money which should have at least been available for the payment
of dividends. In this situation Byrum might have been considered to have
retained an income interest in the transferred property. In one case cited
by the Governments the decedent-grantor had retained, among other
rights, an unrealistically large salary which was unrelated to services and
designed to equal corporate earnings; there the court held that the decedent had retained what amounted to income from the transferred propEstate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829
(1959).

In all of these cases the grantor retained either title or an income interest or right to
use real property for his lifetime. See generally note 24 infra; Soled, Estate Tax Consequences of Inter Vivos Transfers of Stock in a Closely-Held Corporation,31 MD. L. REv.
191, 204 (1971) [hereinafter Soled]; Note, The Doctrine of External Standards Under
Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038, 52 MINN. L. REv. 1071, 1075 (1968).
"Cases cited note 21 supra.

21408
U.S. at 147.
2

Treas. Reg. 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1972) provides in part that enjoyment is retained by a
decedent "to the extent that the use, possession, right to the income or other enjoyment is
to be applied toward the discharge of a legal obligation, or otherwise for his pecuniary
benefit." (Emphasis added). And Treas. Reg. 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1972) speaks of "the person
or persons to receive the income from the transferred property or to possess or enjoy nonincome producing property."
"Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, I T.C. 564 (1943). In
addition to retaining a large "salary" by contract with the corporation which she controlled,
the decedent-donor had taken back the transferred shares as "security," forbade their
transfer or pledge until after her death and that of her husband, and had reserved the right
to vote the stock, elect the directors of the corporation, and be chosen its president.
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erty. On the other hand, in cases where the settlor retained a reasonable
salary, the courts uniformly have held that retention of administrative
powers, such as the power to vote the transferred stock, veto its sale or
otherwise control its disposition, does not endow the settlor with pecuniary benefit from transferred stock. 26 The facts of Byrum clearly fall within
this latter line of cases since there was no indication that Byrum used
voting control to pay himself an unreasonably large salary. The Byrum
majority mentioned further that while the controlling shareholder in a
closely held corporation is likely to be an executive in the corporation
and have a significant voice in his own compensation, his ability to favor
himself is subject to constraintsY
The Court stated that the Government's argument was also conceptually unsound.2 "Control" in the sense used by the Government (the
right to vote more than 50% of the shares) was never an attribute of the
trust shares since Byrum transferred less than 50% of the outstanding
shares to the trustee. Byrum's retention of voting control, then, could not
possibly be "enjoyment" within the meaning of§ 2036(a)(1), which deals
with the retention of an attribute of the transferredproperty. This portion
of the majority's opinion, however, was not essential to the Court's
§ 2036(a)(1) conclusion. The fact that Byrum did not and could not 29 receive economic benefit from the transferred property, not the fact that
he never divested himself of control, made § 2036(a)(1) inapplicable. As
the majority stated, "Even if Byrum had transferred a majority of the
stock, but had retained voting control, he would not have retained 'substantial present economic benefits.' "30
The majority's § 2036(a)(1) holding did not suggest, as Mr. Justice
White seemed to feel it did,3 that voting control of a corporation does
not have value.3 2 It merely stated that retention of voting control could
26

Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790, modifying 4 T.C. 542 (1945), acquiesced
in and nonacquiesced in,1945 CuM. BULL, 4, 8. See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U.S. 339 (1929); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Il1.1968); Soled at
204. See also Estate of Harry Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971-2 CuM.
BULL. 1; Estate of William L. Belknap, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 769 (1951).
z'Justice Powell, writing for the majority, mentions that under Ohio law directors may
be held liable for the payment of excessive compensation (see, e.g., Berkwitz v. Humphrey,
163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958), and that the Internal Revenue Service under § 162(a)(1)
of the Code disallows the deduction of unreasonable compensation paid a corporate executive, 408 U.S. at 150.
2Id. at 148.
2'See note 27 supra.
30408 U.S. at 148-49.
3
See id. at 154-55.
3rrhat voting control of a corporation has value and can bring a premium on the sale
of the shares is universally recognized. See, e.g., Honigman v.Green Giant Co., 208 F.
Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961), affd., 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941
(1963). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 675(4) taxes the income of transferred shares to the

1973]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

not give Byrum "enjoyment" of the transferred property within the meaning of § 2036(a)(1).
§ 2036(a)(2)-The Right to Designate

The Government made its strongest argument under § 2036(a)(2),
and it is the Byrum Court's response to this argument that portends the

greatest impact on estate planning and taxation. The Government asserted that by retaining voting control, Byrum could elect a majority of
the directors in each of the corporations, thereby controlling the dividend
policy of the corporations and thus the "flow of income to the trust."-"
This retained power, it was asserted,34 together with Byrum's right to
veto the sale of trust shares, amounted to retention of "the right . . . to
designate the persons who shall . . . enjoy the property or the income

therefrom" within the meaning of § 2036(a)(2). The basic issue before the
Court, then, was whether Byrum's power with respect to the trust constituted a "right . . .to designate" within the meaning of the statute. In

analyzing the issue, the majority first examined the nature of Byrum's
power and then the extent of his power.
grantor, even though he has completely transferred title, if he has the power, exercisable in
a non-fiduciary capacity, to vote stock of a corporation in which the holdings of the grantor
and the trust "are significant from the viewpoint of voting control." In 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, § 107 (1971), the author points out that in a closely held corporation, where
the income value of stock is frequently small, control of the corporation is vitally important.
This is especially true where the holder of control is an officer of the corporation since
in his capacity as an officer or employee of the corporation, he looks to
his salary for the principal return of his capital investment, because earnings of a close corporation, as is well known, are distributed in major part
in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits.
Id.
That control has value and that the settlor in Byrum did not transfer control suggests
an alternate and more direct solution in such situations than that provided by § 2036(a). If
the grantor retains control, he has retained something of value, and even if it does not entitle
him to "enjoy" the benefits of transferred shares, the value of control could be included in
the grantor's gross estate. Problems of accurate valuation would of course exist, but it has
been recognized that additional value may properly be attributed to a majority interest
because of the element of corporate control, and that a discount may be justified because
of the lack of control and difficulty of selling a minority interest. See Harnack, Techniques
in Preparing a Valuation Case, N.Y.U. 30TH INST. ON FED. TAX. at 196 (1972); Rev. Rul.
59-60, Cum. BULL. 59-1, 237; Drybrough v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Ky.
1962); Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D.Conn. 1954) (a gift tax case). In
Rev. Rul. 67-54, CuM. BULL. 1967-8, 10, it was stated that
[u]nder § 2031 of the Code--"Definition of Gross Estate," the value of
the non-voting shares included in the gross estate should reflect the additional value inherent in the closely-held voting shares by reason of control
of the company policies.
3408 U.S. at 132.
34
1d.
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The Nature of the Settlor's Power
The majority found that Byrum's power was analogous in its nature
to reserved managerial powers over trust property. Relying on the
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. 3 5 line of cases,36 the majority stated:
"[T]his Court has never held that trust property must be included in a
settlor's gross estate solely because the settlor retained the power to
'37
manage trust assets.
The Court cited with favor Estate of King v. Commissioner3 where
the Tax Court rejected the Government's argument that the settlor's
reserved power to direct the trustee in the investment of trust assets,
which power thus controlled significantly the flow of income into the
-278 U.S. 339 (1929). This case was decided under the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136,
§ 402, 42 Stat. 278, which was not a predecessor of § 2036(a)(2), but the rule of that case
seems to have been accepted by the lower courts (see note 36 infra) in reference to
2036(a)(2), and the case has never been overruled by the Supreme Court (see cases note 37
infra). It was obviously reaffirmed by the majority decision in Byrum. In Northern Trust,
the settlor had reserved the power to supervise the investment of trust funds by the trustee,
to require the trustee to execute proxies to the settlor's nominee, to vote any shares in trust,
to control all leases, and to appoint successor trustees. The Court held that these reserved
powers of management did not give the decedent any control over the economic benefit or
enjoyment of the property. As the dissent in Byrum pointed out, the question of voting
control was not at issue in Northern Trust. 408 U.S. at 153 (White, J., dissenting).
36
Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1971), affg per curiam 53
T.C. 114 (1969); Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970) ("We
hold that no aggregation of purely administrative powers can meet the government's amorphous test of 'sufficient dominion and control' so as to be equated to ownership." Id. at
603); United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Wilson's
Estate, 187 F.2d 145 (3rd Cir. 1951), affg per curiam, 13 T.C. 869 (1949); Yeazel v. Coyle,
68-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
12,524 (N.D. Ill.
1968); Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968);
Estate of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973
(1962); Estate of Pierre Jay Wurts, 29 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 610 (1960); Estate of George
W. Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946); Estate of William F. Hofford, 4 T.C. 790 (1945), modifying 4
T.C. 542.
1408 U.S. at 132-33. See Helvering v. Duke, 290 U.S. 591 (1933); McCormick v.
Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931). In Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949)
and Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949), the Court invited, sua sponte,
the question of the effect of broad administrative powers held by a grantor-trustee under
§ 81 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, but did not reach or discuss the issue in the
opinions.
-'37 T.C. 973 (1962). The settlor in King had expressly reserved the right to invest or
reinvest the trust principal in any kind of property, even though speculative, extrahazardous, or non-productive. There the settlor, unlike Byrum, had a legal right to affect
the flow of income to the trust. Byrum's power to affect the flow of income was not a legally
reserved right but derived from his control over the corporations. In neither case did the
settlor have a legal right to pay or accumulate income since this right had been reserved to
an independent trustee. In Byrum, any right the settlor may have had to designate who
would enjoy trust income was indirect and de facto since it was ihrough the flow of income
to the trust.
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trust, was equivalent to the power to designate who shall enjoy the income
from the transferred property. The court in King stated that in the man-

agement of the trust the grantor "had in effect made himself a fiduciary"
and that under the law of New York he was not at liberty to administer

the trust for his own benefit or to ignore the rights of the beneficiaries,
even though he had broad discretion as to the types of investments he

could make.39 Although not in issue in Byrum, the Court's discussion of
King indicated that where a settlor must act as a fiduciary his retained
right to direct the investment of trust assets would not be considered "the
right. . . to designate" within the meaning of § 2036(a)(2).4 The Court,
while acknowledging that neither Northern Trust nor King controlled,
stated that the power retained by Byrum was essentially the same managerial power retained by the settlor in those cases.4

As the majority in Byrum recognized, the case of United States v.
O'Malley" established that the right of a grantor-trustee to accumulate

income in a trust constitutes the right to designate the persons who shall
enjoy the trust income within the meaning of § 2036(a)(2).43 The Government maintained that Byrum's powers were tantamount to the power to
31

1d. at 980.
10A recent case, Estate of Arthur A. Chalmers, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. (July 27, 1972) 72158 involved a decedent-settlor who had retained the right, in conjunction with the trustees,
to direct the investment of property placed in trust by him. Noting that Byrum had "specifically approved the decision of this court in Estate of Willard V. King," the Tax Court
concluded that "while the facts in the Byrum case may be dissimilar to the facts before this
court, it is controlling here." Id. The settlor's powers with respect to the trusts were said to
fall short of the power to regulate the flow of income as between the life beneficiaries and
the remainder interest. The value of the trust property was held not to be includable in the
decedent's gross estate under either § 2036(a)(2) or § 2038(a) (1).
"Northern Trust did not control since it had not been decided under § 2036(a)(2) or a
predecessor; King did not control because it was a lower court case. 408 U.S. at 134.
42383 U.S. 627 (1966).

U.S. at 135-36. O'Malley was decided under § 811(c)(1)(B)(ii) of the INT. REv.
1939, a predecessor of § 2036(a)(2). There, the income beneficiaries and the
remaindermen were the same persons. The Court concluded that Fabrice, by his power to
distribute or accumulate, could deny the beneficiaries
4408

CODE OF

the privilege of immediate enjoyment . . . conditioning their eventual

enjoyment upon surviving the termination of the trust. This is a significant
power, see Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 487 [1946],
and of sufficient substance to be deemed the power to "designate" within
the meaning of § 81 l(c)(l)(B)(ii).
383 U.S. at 631. The Court in O'Malley cited Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165
F.2d 142 (Ist Cir. 1947), which affirmed Estate of Milton J. Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946)
with respect to the conclusion that a power to accumulate or distribute is a right to "designate" where the beneficiaries and the remaindermen may not be the same persons. 408 U.S.
at 136. See also Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Joy v. United States, 404
F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1968) (relying on O'Malley); Ritter v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 1259
(S.D. W. Va. 1968).
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accumulate income within the trust and therefore were within the scope
of § 2036(a)(2).44 But the majority distinguished O'Malley, wherein the
settlor, Fabrice, had been one of three trustees under trusts he had created, each of which provided that the trustees, in their sole discretion,
could pay trust income to the beneficiaries or accumulate the income, in
which event it would become part of the principal. As the majority
pointed out, the facts in O'Malley "were clearly within the ambit of what
is now § 2036(a)[(2)]."1 s There, the settlor had an expressly reserved legal
right set forth in the trust instrument itself, which authorized him to
accumulate or pay out income from the trust and thereby designate the
persons who would enjoy the income from the trust property.
The Court stated that when used in a tax statute "right" should be
given its normal and customary meaning: "It connotes an ascertainable
'
and legally enforceable power, such as that involved in O'Malley."45
Byrum had reserved no such power with respect to the accumulation or
disposition of trust income. Byrum's power over income, whatever it may
have been, was derived not from a legally enforceable right expressed in
the trust instrument, but from his power to elect a majority of directors,
which gave him no right, the majority argued, to command them to pay
or not to pay dividends. Byrum's power over the distribution of income
from the transferred property, then, was indirect, being derived not from
his reserved rights as a trust-advisor but from his relationship to the
corporations. Only through his control over the corporations did Byrum
have any "rights" with respect to the distribution of the trust income to
the beneficiaries." As the majority stated, "the corporate trustee alone,
not Byrum, had the right to pay out or withhold income and thereby to
designate who among the beneficiaries enjoyed such income." 9
The Court's argument that "right" as used in § 2036(a)(2) refers to a
legally enforceable and ascertainable power finds support in both the
plain meaning of the statute and, in spite of Mr. Justice White's contention to the contrary," the legislative history of § 2036(a)(2).10 It is clear
"408 U.S. at 132.
"Id. at 136.
6
1d. (emphasis added).
"See Soled at 192-95.
4408 U.S. at 137.
Old. at 159-60.
"See generally Note, Application of Sections 2036(a)(l)-(2) to Transfers in Trust of
Stock in Closely Held Corporations,60 MIcH. L. REv. 631, 633-636 (1962). As the dissent
points out, the predecessor of§ 2036(a)(2), based on the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931,
ch. 454, 46 Stat. 1516, was passed as Congressional response to May v. Heiner, 281 U.S.
238 (1930), which involved a reserved life estate. 408 U.S. at 165 (White, J., dissenting). It
had been hoped that May could be distinguished, but three per curiam opinions, Burnet v.
Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931);
McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931), handed down on March 2, 1931 made it clear
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that, regardless of the absolute degree or amount of power Byrum in fact

had over the pecuniary enjoyment of the transferred property, his power
was, as the majority stated, "a qualitatively different power from that of

the settlor in O'Malley."' What is not clear from the majority's opinion
is how much weight should be given to the fact that a settlor's control

(irrespective of its extent) is not "an ascertainable and legally enforceable
power" set forth in the trust agreement, but an indirect, de facto power
such as Byrum possessed.

Application of "legal enforceability" as a definitive test of a settlor's
retained power to determine whether § 2036(a)(2) should apply on any
given set of facts would appear to be overly restrictive in light of cases

which stress the reliance in tax matters on substance rather than on form
and technical vesting of titles.12 The broad purpose of § 2036(a) is to

include in a decedent's gross estate "transfers which leave the transferor
a significant interest in or control over the property tranfserred during
his lifetime. 5 3 Arguably, if a transferor has retained the power to signifithat under § 401 of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1096, the Supreme Court did not
consider trust property with a reserved life estate to be includable in the decedent's gross
estate. The next day, Congress responded with the Joint Resolution of March 3, which § 803
of ch. 209, Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 279, put into law with few changes. Nothing in
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to do more than cover the "loophole" created by May, dealing with reserved life estates. In any event, although the
language of the statute possibly may be construed to encompass such situations as that
presented in Byrum, it seems unlikely that Congress contemplated such circumstances, or
used the word "right" to mean anything broader than a legally enforceable right.
51408 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added).
5
'See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940); Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.
1959). These cases were not decided under the "right . . . to designate" provision of
2036(a)(2), but under predecessors of the "possession or enjoyment . . . or right to the
income" clause of 2036(a)(1). In Church, where the settlor had reserved no power to alter,
amend or revoke, but required the trustee to pay him income for life, the Court said "the
Hallock case, p. 114, stands plainly for the principal that 'In determining whether a taxable
transfer becomes complete only at death we look to substance, not to form ... '" 335 U.S.
at 644. In language which the minority in Byrum emphasized, the Court in Church stated
further:
[A]n estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except by a bona
fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivocably, irrevocably,
and without possible reservations, parts with all of his title and all of his
possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property."
335 U.S. at 645.
In the McNichol case the taxpayer claimed that since the decedent had no way of enforcing
an oral agreement under which he had received income from the transferred property, he
had retained no "right" to the income. The court relied on Church and stated "substance
not form is made the touchstone of taxability," and found that the decedent had retained
enjoyment of the property. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 673 (3d
Cir. 1959).
OUnited States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969).
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cantly affect the present economic beneficial enjoyment of the transferred
property, § 2036(a)(2) should apply, regardless of whether the nature of
the power is legal or de facto.
On the other hand, application of § 2036(a)(2) to de facto powers
might well be too broad; at what point should de facto power be subject
to § 2036(a)(2)? The Tax Court has stated that applicability of § 2036(a)
does not depend on "the express reservation of a legally enforceable right,
but it suggests the need for prearrangement, or at least an informal
agreement or understanding under which the right is retained." 5
It could be argued that in Byrum the settlor's powers were not merely
de facto since, as a director,55 the settlor did have a legal right "in conjunction with another person or persons" 56 (i.e., other directors) to declare
dividends. In this capacity as a director Byrum owed a fiduciary duty not
to the beneficiaries and remaindermen to treat them equally as would a
trustee, but to the minority shareholders, one of whom was the trustee
of the transferred shares, to use good faith business judgment. Although
this "right" would not be a direct legal right reserved in the trust instrument, it has been said that § 2036 of the Code "applies not only where
the reservation of rights or control over property is expressed in the
instrument of transfer, but also where the right is retained in connection
with, or as an incident to, the transfer."58
The regulations which accompany § 2036(a)(2) contain language
which may be construed to support either the position that (a)(2) refers
to de facto powers as well as legal rights or the position that (a) (2) does
not apply to a settlor whose control with respect to the income distribution from transferred property is only through the flow of income to the
trust. One portion of the regulations states:
"Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242, 247-48 (1970), acquiescedin 1971-2 CuM.
BULL. I.

*5Although the facts as set forth in Byrum do not specifically state that Mr. Byrum
had been a director of any of the corporations, the language of the Court indicates this,
particularly at 408 U.S. 142, where the Court discussed actions of Byrum "as a controlling
stockholder or as a director." (Emphasis added).
"See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3)(i) (1972).
5
n discussing the constraints on Byrum's power (see note 74 and accompanying text
infra.) the Court mentions that there were a substantial number of minority shareholders
in each of the Byrum corporations. See note 11 supra. It should be noted that in cases
involving a transfer of less than 100% of stock by a controlling shareholder into trust, there
will be at least one minority shareholder, i.e., the trustee. See, e.g., note 81 infra.
The Court stated that the corporate trustee in Byrum was a minority shareholder and
"had both the right and the duty to hold Byrum responsible for any wrongful or negligent
actions as a director." 408 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added). By stating that the trustee had a
duty to hold Byurm accountable, the Court suggests that the beneficiaries or remaindermen
could compel the trustee to perform this duty, even if they could not hold Byrum directly
accountable themselves.
5'Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 247 (1970).
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The phrase "right ...

to designate.

.

." includes a reserved

power to designate the person or persons to receive the income
from the transferred property. . . . With respect to such a power,
it is immaterial. . . (ii) in what capacity the power was exercisable by the decedent. . . . The phrase, however, does not include

a power over the transferred property itself which does not affect
the enjoyment of the income received or earned during the decedent's life.59
The position that § 2036(a)(2) was intended to refer to de facto powers
may be supported by the regulation's use of the word "power," although
its use does not necessarily mean that § 2036(a)(2) was intended to encompass anything more than legal powers. The regulation makes clear that
if Byrum had been held to have retained the "right

. .

. to designate,"

his capacity as a shareholder and as a director would not prevent application of § 2036(a)(2).
On the other hand, the first sentence of the regulation quoted above
which deals with a power to designate the persons to enjoy incomefrom
the transferred property, together with the last portion of the regulation
which states when the phrase "right

. .

. to designate" does not apply,

could be used to argue that Byrum's power, whatever its nature, legal or
de facto, direct or indirect, should not be covered by § 2036(a)(2). It
could be argued that his power does not affect the enjoyment of income
received or earned on the transferred property, since until dividends have
been declared, no income on the transferred shares has been earned (although their value may have increased). Once dividends have been declared and received by the trustee, a settlor with Byrum's reserved powers
would have no power to affect who among the beneficiaries and remaindermen of the trust would enjoy the income. Only a settlor, such as
Fabrice in O'Malley, who is in a position to affect enjoyment of received
or earned income (as contrasted with a settlor who is in a position to
affect what income might be earned or received) would be subject to
§ 2036(a)(2). Such a narrow construction would reject totally any flow
of income argument, regardless of the extent of a settlor's control over
the flow of income, where a trustee with independent discretion to accumulate or pay out whatever income may be earned on the trust assets
stands between the settlor's control and the distribution and allocation of
income from the trust.
The opinion of the Court in Byrum, however, is not so narrow. The
majority did not reject the flow of income argument per se, nor did it hold
that the de facto power of a controlling shareholder could never be subject
to § 2036(a)(2). In answering one of the dissent's arguments, Mr. Justice
Powell stated:
5

'Treas. Reg. 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1972) (emphasis added).
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We do not hold that a settlor "may keep the power of income
allocation" in the way Mr. Justice White sets out [i.e., by rendering the trust dependent on an income flow the settlor controls]; we
hold . . . that this settlor did not retain the power to allocate
income within the meaning of the statute."
The majority's position with respect to de facto power is not so clear;
it might reasonably be inferred from the Court's line of argument that a
de facto power could never be subject to the provisions of § 2036(a)(2),
since "right" as used in the statute must be a legal right. The Court does
say that the Government's approach of equating "the de facto position
of a controlling stockholder with the legally enforceable 'right' specified
by the statute"'" departed from the specific statutory language. If the
Court had stopped here, the Byrum case clearly would have created a
"gaping loophole in the estate tax laws." ' 62
The Court, however, also emphasized the constraints on Byrum's
power, and concluded its § 2036(a)(2) position by stating:
We find no merit to the Government's contention that Byrum's
de facto "control," subject as it was to . . . economic and legal
constraints . . ., was tantamount to the right to designate the
persons who shall enjoy trust income, specified by § 2036(a)(2). 3
The language of the Court indicates that there is a point at which a
controlling shareholder's de facto power over the flow of income to shares
in trust, absent some or all of the constraints which the Court found to
be present in Byrum, would result in the application of § 2036(a)(2).
To apply § 2036(a)(2) to a de facto power alone would be tantamount
to equating the power to the legally enforceable right which the statute
specifies. Since the majority's decision in Byrum seems to be dependent,
at least in part, upon the constraints on Byrum's de facto control (i.e.,
since the decision is dependent on the extent and not just the nature of
Byrum's control), the majority indicates that as the constraints on a de
facto power decrease, the power takes on more of the qualities of an
ascertainable and legally enforceable right. The settlor's power in Byrum,
constrained as it was, had not achieved the status of legal enforceability.
In arguing that Byrum's de facto control was sufficient to trigger
application of § 2036(a)(2), the Government relied on Commissioner v.
Sunnen. 4 The Court distinguished that case on the ground that it was a
at 144 n.25 (emphasis added).
11ld. at 138.
'2Id. at 153 (White, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
"4333 U.S. 591 (1948). In Sunnen the taxpayer assigned to his wife his interest under a

8408 U.S.

royalty agreement he had received from a corporation of which he was the president, a
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personal income tax and an assignment of income case where the issue
was power over income, whereas Byrum "concern[ed] a statute written
in terms of the 'right' to designate the recipient of income." 5 The Court
then stated:
The use of the term "right" implies that restraints on the exercise
of power are to be recognized and that such restraints deprive the

person exercising the power of a "right" to do so. 6
This language indicates that the extent of a power, or the lack of restraints on a power, may determine whether or not the power is a "right."
It would seem that a settlor could have a right to designate under

§ 2036(a)(2) in either of two ways: the right may either be an express
reserved legal power or a de facto power not expressly reserved but which,
due to the lack of constraints, may be considered a legal right.
Constraints on the Settlor's Power

To the extent that the majority's opinion is based on limitations upon
Byrum's actual control over the flow of income to the trust, it is an
application of the so-called "external standards doctrine" to an unusual
set of facts. The doctrine of external standards states that where a gran-

tor's powers to designate enjoyment of property interests are ministerial
or controlled by a standard, and thus are duties enforceable in a court of

equity, the property so transferred is not includable in the grantor's gross
estate when he dies. 7 The leading case on the judicially created doctrine 8
is Jennings v. Smith."9 The trustees in that case, one of whom was the

decedent-settlor, were empowered to invade the trust corpus if the beneficiaries "should suffer prolonged illness or be overtaken by financial misdirector and an 89% stockholder. The Commissioner taxed the royalty income to the
taxpayer on the ground that as a controlling stockholder, he had retained a substantial
interest in the royalty contracts, and had the power to fix the amount of royalties and their
time of payment to his wife. One non-tax consequence of the Byrum case may be an
alteration of the view courts take toward the influence of a controlling stockholder on
corporate policy.
61408 U.S. at 139 n.14.
9ad.
67
Note, The Doctrine of External Standards Under Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038, 52
MINN. L. REv. 1071, 1079 (1968).
'he doctrine was first set forth in Estate of Milton J. Budlong v. Commissioner, 7
T.C. 756 (1946), affd in part, Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir.
1947). In Budlong, the court held that where a grantor-trustee had unlimited power to
distribute trust income or accumulate it and add to principal, "that was a right to shift
economic benefits from one person to another," and taxable under 811(c). See Estate of
Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), which relied on Budlong in holding that for the.
"best interest" of the beneficiaries did not establish an adequate external standard.
6161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
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fortune which the trustees deem extraordinary."70 The court held that the
trustees were not free to exercise untrammeled discretion since they were
to be governed by determinable standards enforceable in courts of equity,
so that §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038 did not apply.
The doctrine has been applied in numerous cases' and was at issue
in O'Malley before it reached the Supreme Court.7 2 As the dissent in
Byrum pointed out, the district court in O'Malley held that under the law
of Illinois the general fiduciary duty owed the beneficiaries by the settlortrustee did not sufficiently circumscribe his otherwise unrestricted power
to distribute or accumulate trust income to prevent application of

§ 2036(a)(2).

73

The majority in Byrum found that the settlor "did not have an unconstrained defacto power to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust.' 74
701d. at 76.
7
The doctrine has been applied to powers of invasion (of trust corpus) and retained
managerial powers as well. For standards held to be adequate with respect to powers of
invasion, see United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962) (when necessary for
the beneficiary's "maintenance and welfare"); Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947)
(prolonged illness or financial misfortune which the trustees deem extraordinary); Estate
of C. Dudley Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949), affd per curiam, 187 F.2d 145 (3rd Cir. 1951);
Estate of John J. Toeller, 6 T.C. 832 (1946), affd, 165 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1948) ("misfortune"); Estate of Walter E. Frew, 8 T.C. 1240 (1947) (income "insufficient for the proper
maintenance and support of the beneficiary"). For cases where managerial or administrative
retained powers have been held sufficiently restricted, see Old Colony Trust Co. v. United
States, 423 F.2d 601 (lst Cir. 1970) (which expressly repudiated State Street Trust Co.v.
United States, 160 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1958), affd, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959)); Estate
of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962); Estate of Pierre Jay Wurts, 29 P-H TAX CT.MEM.
610 (1960).
72220 F. Supp. 30 (N.D. Ill. 1963), affd, 340 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1964).
73220 F. Supp. at 33. But see, e.g., United States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir.
1962), where the court held that state law provided a judicially enforceable and judicially
established standard.
71408 U.S. at 143. As constraints on Byrum's power, the Court discusses the following
factors: (1) the fiduciary duty of corporate directors to promote the interests of the corporation-whose responsibilities, regardless of Byrum's influence, were to all stockholders "and
enforceable according to legal standards entirely unrelated to the needs of the trust or to
Byrum's desires with respect thereto," 408 U.S. at 138; (2) the fiduciary duty of a controlling shareholder not to misuse his power by promoting personal interests at the expense of
corporate interests (derivative suits to enforce the fiduciary duties); (3) the existence of a
"substantial number" (see note 11 supra.) of minority shareholders; (4) INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 531-537, the penalty tax on excess accumulated earnings; INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 § 162(a)(1), permitting corporate deductions of "reasonable" compensation; (5) limited access to capital markets; (6) corporate need for retained earnings; and (7) the "customary vicissitudes" of small businesses-bad years, product obsolescence, new competition,
disastrous litigation, inhibiting government regulations, bankruptcy. Id. at 138-142.
The Court also emphasizes that the corporate trustee, not Byrum, had the right to pay
out or withhold income earned on the trust property, so that "[e]ven had Byrum managed
to flood the trust with income, he had no way of compelling the trustee to pay it out rather
than accumulate it." Id. at 143.
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It is not clear whether the majority considered Byrum's control over the
beneficial enjoyment of trust income, in an absolute sense, to be more or
less restricted than that of the settlor in O'Malley. The Court did state
that Byrum's power was a "qualitatively different power" than that involved in O'Malley.75 The Court seems to be saying that where a settlor's
control over the beneficial enjoyment of the trust income is indirect and
de facto, § 2036(a)(2) should not be expanded to encompass the situation
if the settlor is subject to the constraints of a general fiduciary obligation.
The minority points out that within such constraints, a settlor may still
have a fairly broad range of influence which may not be subject to judicial
examination.76 For example, Byrum had the right, in conjunction with
other persons, to declare or not to declare dividends within the range of
business judgment.7 It would seem that within the limits of business
judgment, Byrum
could substantially affect the present enjoyment of the
78
trust property.
The majority stated that Byrum had the "ability to affect, but not
control, the trust income; ' 7 it did not indicate how much control over
trust income a controlling shareholder would have to possess before
§ 2036(a)(2) would become applicable. Even if a settlor did have unconstrained control over the flow of trust income, his power would still be
qualitatively different from a reserved legal right to control the payment
of income to the beneficiaries. As the majority said, "Even had Byrum
managed to flood the trust with income, he had no way of compelling the
trustee to pay it out rather than accumulate it.""s However, due to the
emphasis on legal and economic constraints, it is clear that the Court left
itself open to reach a different result where a settlor has fewer constraints.
For example, if a trustee were required by the trust agreement to pay out
all income, a good argument could be made for applying § 2036(a)(2)
where a settlor controls the flow of income. There, the settlor could
determine with certainty whether the beneficiaries or the remaindermen
75d.

"Id. at 158-59.
"See id. at 158.
"Because of the intervening discretion of the corporate trustee, Byrum could not affect
present economic enjoyment of the trust income by accelerating dividend payments. Within
the range of "business judgment," however, Byrum could prevent or retard the payment of
dividends on trust shares; arguably, he could thereby effectively withhold from the current
beneficiaries economic enjoyment of the transferred property. The majority opinion, then,
while conceptually sound and consistent with the statutory language of § 2036(a)(2), is
arguably at odds with the underlying policy of that section to tax the value of property over
which the transferor has retained significant control as to the present economic enjoyment
of the property or the income therefrom.
"1408 U.S. at 143.
8*d.; see note 74 supra.
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would enjoy economic benefit of the trust."'
Generalizing from the Byrum decision, it would appear that where
there is no legally enforceable right specified in the trust agreement, that
is, where the "rights" of the settlor are de facto and indirect, a general
fiduciary obligation on the part of the settlor is sufficient to make
§ 2036(a)(2) inapplicable. Furthermore, where the "right" attributed to
the settlor is not expressly reserved in the trust instrument, an "external
standard" constraining the settlor's power need not be expressly set forth
in the trust agreement but instead may be supplied by state law.
Policy Considerations
The majority's opinion was affected by its reluctance to hand down a
decision which it felt might have brought about a change in the complex
field of taxation:
Courts have properly been reluctant to depart from an interpretation of tax law which has been generally accepted when the departure could have potentially far-reaching consequences. When a
principle of taxation requires re-examination, Congress is better
equipped than a court to define precisely the type of conduct which
82
results in tax consequences.
Not being able to anticipate what consequences might have resulted from
a decision adverse to the taxpayer, the Court chose nonfeasance over the
possibility of misfeasance; rather than create tax policy, th: Court chose
to defer to Congress.
The Court, accepting as it did the taxpayer's argument that Byrum's
retained powers were essentially managerial, was concerned that a decision against the taxpayer would reject the doctrine of the Northern Trust
case, "that the settlor of a trust may retain broad powers of management
without adverse estate tax consequences, [a rule which] may have been
81
1t is not clear what the Byrum Court would do with a situation such as that set forth
in Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 269. There, a settlor had put 990 shares of nonvoting common stock in an irrevocable trust, while he retained 10 shares (100%) of the
voting common stock and the right to veto the sale of the trust shares. Thus, the only
shareholder to whom the settlor owed a duty was the trustee, and the settlor clearly had
retained complete control over dividend policy. The Service determined that the settlor had
retained "the right. . . to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom." INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(2). Due to the emphasis in
Byrum on the existence in each of the corporations of a "substantial number" (see note II
supra.) of minority shareholders, it is not clear, even for all the language in Byrum about
the legal right to control distribution (rather than the amount available for distribution) of
trust income, that the Court would hold for the taxpayer. In fact, there is cause to believe
the Court would find § 2036(a)(2) applicable there, where the control of the settlor is
unconstrained by any fiduciary duty, except to the trustee as a "minority" shareholder.
12408 U.S. at 135.
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relied upon in the drafting of hundreds of inter vivos trusts." Of course,
if the Court had not analogized Byrum's powers to managerial powers,
a decision against the taxpayer would have left the Northern Trust
doctrine untouched. Moreover, as the minority argued, there may be
some question as to whether the doctrine of that case is "generally accepted."' "
The Court was also concerned that acceptance of the Government's
position would "seriously disadvantage settlors in a control posture
... .The language of the statute does not support such a result and we
cannot believe Congress intended it to have such discriminatory and farreaching impact." It may be argued, however, that when a settlor transfers shares of stock he need give up only his power over the present
economic enjoyment of the property and not corporate voting control.
For example, by reserving the right to vote the shares but permitting an
independent trustee to determine where and when to sell the trust shares
(subject to the reserved right to vote the shares), it would seem that a
settlor has given up control over the beneficial enjoyment of the trust
corpus and income.
The Court maintained further that the "control" rationale urged by
the Government would create a standard "so vague and amorphous as
to be impossible of ascertainment in many instances."86 As the majority
points out, "control" for some corporate purpose is not necessarily control for others, and effective control may require ownership of less than
50% of the outstanding shares. On the other hand, the majority's opinion
itself suffers from a similar problem of vagueness: how to determine at
what point a settlor's voting control is sufficiently constrained to avoid
application of § 2036(a)(2).
Conclusions

The Court in Byrum, although it did construe § 2036(a) narrowly, left
a range within which courts could find the statute applicable to transfers
by controlling stockholders who irrevocably transfer some or all of their
stock into trust while retaining the right to v6te the shares and veto their
sale. Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly delineate any standard or
provide any guidelines for dejermining when a settlor's retained powers
would trigger the statute.
However, with respect to subsection (a)(1) of § 2036 it may be said
that the Byrum decision performed a clarifying function. The Court's
911d. at 134.

'"See id. at 162-168.
Uld. at 149 n.34. See note 14 and text accompanying note 28 supra.
Uld. at 137 n.10.
9ld. at 138 n.13.
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holding, while construing "enjoyment" narrowly, is consistent with the
interpretation of that portion of the statute suggested by the regulations
and applied by case precedent. The majority opinion would seem to establish that "enjoy" and "enjoyment" as used in § 2036(a)(1) mean "substantial present economic benefit;" that to "enjoy" transferred property,
a grantor must actually derive or have the right to derive present benefits
of a pecuniary nature from the transferred property. Where income producing property is involved, the Byrum opinion suggests that if a transferor has irrevocably transferred the property and made complete delivery, he retains "enjoyment" only through retention of an income interest
in the transferred property itself. In Byrum, since any benefits the decedent may have retained were not attributes of the transferred property
and did not entitle the decedent to an income interest in the transferred
trust shares, the Court found § 2036(a)(1) inapplicable.
In its § 2036(a)(2) holding, the majority found that Byrum's powers
were essentially managerial. In doing so, the Court revitalized the doctrine of Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. and clearly established that
retention of broad powers of management over trust assets does not in
itself result in the inclusion of the property in the decedent's gross estate.
On the crucial matter of what retained powers amount to a "right...
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom," the meaning of the Court's analysis is regrettably
unclear. "Right" as used in § 2036(a)(2), the Court stated, means an
"ascertainable and legally enforceable power." Where a settlor's power
over the distribution is not a legal right expressly reserved in the trust
instrument, but a de facto power over the flow of income to the trust, it
might seem that by the majority's interpretation of "right," the statute
could never apply. However, since the Court in Byrum looked not only
at the nature of the settlor's de facto power as a controlling shareholder,
but also at the extent of his power, such a conclusion would apparently
be false. The majority's analysis suggests that a de facto power with too
few constraints may become or be treated as a legal right.
Application of § 2036(a)(2) is not necessarily avoided, then, by setting
up a trust so as to insure that the settlor's control over distribution of trust
income is de facto; attention must also be given to the extent of the de
facto control. As to what constitutes sufficient constraint on a de facto
power to avoid application of § 2036(a)(2), the Court is again unclear,
but some generalizations may be drawn. The Court seems to suggest that
where a power is not expressly reserved in the trust agreement, constraints on the power, i.e., an extrenal standard limiting the power, need
not be expressly set forth in the instrument either. The Court also suggests that where a trustee has independent discretion over the accumulation or payment of income from the trust, a settlor's de facto power to
effect the flow of income to the trust is not a "right . . . to designate"

